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ABSTRACT
Computer network defense (CND) protects organizations and individuals against
cyber threats by monitoring, identifying, analyzing, and defending network infrastructure
from infiltration. Network defenders must maintain high levels of cyber situation
awareness (CSA) in order to correctly identify and act on threats to the network. Intrusion
detection systems (IDSs) are automated systems designed to assist network defenders in
building CSA by sifting through network traffic and flagging potential threats. These
systems are plagued by high false alarm rates that inhibit the ability of network defenders
to build CSA. More capable IDSs have been developed that are capable of increasing the
hit rate and lowering the false alarm rate by analyzing gathered network information. The
influence of these IDS technologies on CSA has yet to be explored. 172 San Jose State
University psychology students performed a signal detection task for intrusion detection
to examine whether integrated automation with a multilayered analysis incorporating
both liberal and conservative response criteria leads to better CSA than less-integrated,
yet liberally responding automation (high hit rates and high false alarm rates) or
conservatively responding automation (with low hit rates and low false alarm rates). The
IDS condition was manipulated at three levels (liberal, conservative, both). The reliability
of the IDSs was manipulated at three levels (60%, 80%, 95%). This study was unable to
observe any differences in task performance or CSA for any of the conditions.
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Introduction
Statement of the Problem
Computer network defense (CND) protects organizations and individuals against
cyber threats by monitoring, identifying, analyzing, and defending network
infrastructure from infiltration. Network defenders are required to distinguish actual
threats to the network from normal network traffic, determine the nature of the threat,
and decide how to respond (Sawyer et. al. 2014). Success at CND requires an extensive
amount of goal-relevant awareness derived from information in the task environment,
which has been labeled situation awareness (SA; Endsley, 1988). SA has been further
adapted into the domain of cyber security and labeled cyber situation awareness (CSA;
Champion, Rajivan, Cooke, & Jariwala, 2012; D'amico, Whitley, Tesone, O'Brien &
Roth, 2005; Gutzwiller, Hunt, & Lange, 2016; Mahoney et. al, 2010; Onwubiko, 2009;
2016). Building and maintaining CSA is essential for recognizing and responding to
network threats (Jajodia, Liu, Swarup & Wang, 2010; Onwubiko & Owens, 2012).
Intrusion detection systems (IDSs), a form of automation, have been designed to
assist the network defender in monitoring network traffic. IDSs can help defenders build
and maintain the awareness necessary to defend networks. For example, an IDS will run a
scan on the number of users that have logged in and/or out at unusual times and present
those data to the network defender. The data output might take different forms depending
on the type of system. These forms will be described in further detail. Human-machine
relationships are especially important to consider in the domain of CND because it is
impossible for a human network defender to perform the task completely unaided, which
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makes it impossible to completely divorce the human and machine components in CND
from one another.
Misuse-based IDS systems can only detect the threats they are programed to discover.
The advantage of a Misuse-based system is that it is very effective at detecting known
threats (Werlinger, Hawkey, Muldner, Jaferian & Beznosov, 2008). One of the
disadvantages of a Misuse-based system is that it is incapable of detecting novel threats
(Werlinger, Hawkey, Muldner, Jaferian & Beznosov, 2008).
Anomaly-based systems monitor a network and are calibrated to the normal flow of
network traffic on that specific network. If an element of user traffic deviates from the
norm, it is flagged as a potential threat to the system. Anomaly-based systems are
advantageous because it can potentially detect novel threats (Kemmerer & Vigna, 2002).
However, not all abnormal traffic is malicious. Anomaly-based IDSs are incapable of
making that distinction (Werlinger, Hawkey, Muldner, Jaferian & Beznosov, 2008),
which leads to the primary disadvantage of an Anomaly-based system; it produces a vast
number of false alarms that must be reconciled later by a human cyber defender
(Mukkamala, Sung & Abraham, 2005).
Efforts have been made to develop new, more capable IDSs that increase the hit rate
and lower the false alarm rate by analyzing gathered network information. A popular
approach is to integrate both misuse-based and anomaly-based systems together to
combine the strengths of each type of system while compensating for their weaknesses
(Kim, Lee & Kim, 2015). The approach is called a hybrid IDS. A hybrid IDS increases
the level in which the IDS is involved in the task of CND. A hybrid IDS may increase or
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reduce the CSA of cyber defenders depending on how these systems are designed and
implemented. Research on how the hybrid approach influences the CSA of human
network defenders would inform the design of these new systems to optimize
performance outcomes. As hybrid systems are relatively new and have limited
deployment in the field, research in this area has yet to be conducted.
As IDSs are a form of automation, previous research examining how level of
automation (LOA) influences the SA and decision making of human operators may be
applicable in the cyber domain. SA can benefit from the use of diagnostic aiding tools
(Goodrich et. al. 2007; Horrey & Wickens, 2001; Rudisill, 2000). However, under
conditions in which the human and automation operate more independently, increasing
the LOA can lead to detriments in performance outcomes (Kaber & Endsley, 2000; Ruff,
Narayanan, and Draper, 2002).
It is imperative that we improve the CSA of cyber defenders and help them overcome
the challenges inhibiting the discrimination of actual threats from false alarms when
using an IDS. We must understand whether integrated automation with a multilayered
analysis incorporating both liberal and conservative response criteria leads to better CSA
than less-integrated, yet liberally responding automation (high hit rates and high false
alarm rates), or conservatively responding automation (with low hit rates and low false
alarm rates).
Situation Awareness and Cyber Situation Awareness
Situation awareness (SA) arose as a scientific construct when researchers began
studying the source of pilot errors, but it is a broadly applicable skill (Harwood, Barnett,
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& Wickens, 1988). SA is an essential skill in the effective operation of a complex,
dynamic system (Endsley, 1995). SA can be described as task-relevant knowledge
(Endsley, 1988). Endsley (1988) highlighted SA as occurring in three stages. Stage one is
perception, in which information in the task environment is perceived by the operator via
the senses and diagnostic tools. Stage two involves the integration and organization of the
information into a meaningful structure. Stage two is called information comprehension.
Stage three is projection, in which the operator uses the information structure to project a
future outcome and plan future behavior (Endsley 1988). Failures can occur within any of
these stages, resulting in poor SA and subsequent task performance. Sources of these
failures can be attributed to high workload, poor sensing, and unreliability in automated
tools used to aid task performance (Parasuraman, Sheridan & Wickens, 2008).
SA is a domain-specific construct best studied in the context in which it operates
(Flach, 2015). As CND is a highly complex dynamic system, the construct of SA has
been adapted to this domain. The components of SA as they pertain to CND have been
identified and labeled as CSA. The three-stage model still applies, but the task-relevant
knowledge is specific to CND (Onwubiko, 2009; 2016). CSA has been refined more
recently into cyber cognitive situation awareness (CCSA; Gutzwiller, Hunt, & Lange,
2016). According to this model, defenders must maintain awareness of a multitude of
network attributes (network health, status, network architecture, typical traffic), their role
in the team structure (their task, their teammates task, and how they relate to the
superordinate goal), and knowledge of the global security landscape (previous hacks,
active attackers, attack profiles, political relations) to be proficient in CND (Champion,
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Rajivan, Cooke, & Jariwala, 2012; D'amico, Whitley, Tesone, O'Brien & Roth, 2005;
Mahoney et. al, 2010).
Reliability of Automation
Reliability is commonly defined as the percentage to which an automated system can
perform a desired task successfully (Singh, Tiwari & Singh, 2009). In general,
automation reliability and human performance tend to have a positive relationship,
wherein highly reliable automation leads to better task performance. This effect has been
found frequently in the literature in regard to signal detection tasks similar to that in CND
(Madhavan & Phillips, 2010; Dixon, Wickens, & McCarley 2006). Conversely, as
reliability declines, so does human performance. Wickens and Dixon (2007) identified
that performance declines because the human must expend extra cognitive effort to sort
through erroneous information to successfully complete the task.
Reliance on automation and task demand have been found to be moderating variables
between reliability and task performance (Wickens & Dixon 2007). Wickens & Dixon
point out that operators in positions of high task demand rely heavily on automation
despite their awareness of its low reliability level. In CND, due to the volume and speed
of data, human network defenders are in a position in which they cannot perform the task
unaided. As task demands and reliance on the IDS are high in CND, network defenders
may be likely to rely on automation regardless of whether it is reliable or not.
Levels of Automation and SA in CND
Automation is the execution of a task by a machine agent (Parasuraman, 1997).
Levels of automation (LOA) describe how and to what extent the automation is involved
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in a task (Parasuraman, Sheridan & Wickens, 2000; Sheridan & Verplank, 1978). There
are multiple taxonomies of LOA (Kaber & Endsley, 1999; Sheridan & Verplank, 1978).
This study focuses on the levels of diagnostic aiding (Parasuraman, Sheridan & Wickens,
2000); Wickens & Dixon, 2007). Of these levels, the first is information acquisition. At
the first level, the automation gathers information about the task environment and
presents it to the human agent. The second level is information analysis. The second level
refers to when the automation performs an analysis of the data and presents the results to
the human agent. The two levels of diagnostic aiding also correspond to the first two
levels of Endsley’s model of SA, in which information acquisition and information
analysis are similar to perception and comprehension (Schuster, 2013; Horrey et. al.
2009). In the perception level of SA, information about the task environment is gathered
via the senses. The task information is then integrated with existing knowledge structures
to form a complex analysis of the problem space at the comprehension level. Level 1
automation (information acquisition) gathers information from the task environment and
organizes it for presentation. At the information analysis level, the automation will crosscheck this new information with old information and present the information in an
integrated form. For example, a hybrid IDS will examine the network architecture for
anomalous traffic (information acquisition), compare it with what it is programed to
consider normative network behavior, and flag any deviations as potential threats
(information analysis). A hybrid IDS system that implements anomaly-based and misusebased detection in succession would essentially be performing both information
acquisition and information analysis.
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Effects of Level of Automation on SA and Performance
SA is typically shown to increase as LOA increases from level 1 (information
acquisition) to level 2 (information analysis) by reducing the cognitive workload of the
human at the expense of the richness of the information provided (Horrey & Wickens,
2001). At higher stages, the human is further abstracted from relevant data about the
problem, which leads to situations in which increasing the LOA decreases SA as opposed
to raising it further (Ruff, Narayanan, and Draper, 2002). However, layering the
automation so that level 1 information is provided along with level 2 analysis leads to
better performance and SA (Dexter, Willemsen-Dunlap, & Lee, 2007).
However, operators only have better performance in conditions in which the
automation does not make an error. When the automation does make an error, the SA of
the human operator may be reduced (Dexter et. al. 2007). Human operators rely on the
automation and trust that the information they acted on was correct, which leads to an
increase in errors if the information provided by the automation was incorrect. This effect
suggests that not only is SA sensitive to the LOA, but it is also sensitive to the reliability
of the information provided by the automation. This relationship is especially important
to consider in CND where network defenders are highly dependent on the IDS
automation to obtain information about network threats.
Reliability and Level of Automation
Automated systems that incorporate diagnostic aiding have been shown to improve
performance of human operators on tasks (Goodrich et. al, 2007). This effect is
strengthened when the automation is reliable (Madhaven & Philips, 2010). Furthermore,
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research suggests that unreliable automation can have different effects on operator SA
depending on the level of diagnostic aiding being implemented. When compared to
automation employing solely information acquisition, automation employing information
analysis has been shown to have more negative impact on SA when information is
unreliable (Rovira, McGarry, & Parasuraman, 2007; Sarter & Schroeder, 2001).
Similarly, anomaly-based IDSs that only flag potential threats and present them to the
network defender (information acquisition) have the potential to reduce the CSA of a
network defender when false alarm rates are very high. False alarms have been shown to
be more damaging to SA than misses (Dixon, Wickens & McCarley, 2006). This effect is
particularly impactful for anomaly-based IDSs because they are calibrated with a more
liberal response criterion to capture more anomalous network traffic, but produce more
false alarms.
Unreliability in IDSs can better be explained in terms of signal detection theory
(SDT; Swets & Pickett, 1982). IDSs are essentially alarm systems. To most effectively
build SA, a decision criterion must be chosen for the IDS that optimizes how liberal or
conservative it is when determining the alerting threshold (Kuchar, 1996). Ensuring
performance means that the probability that an alarm reflects an actual attack must be
increased as much as possible (Parasuraman, Hancock & Olofinboba, 1997).
Signal Detection in Cyber Security
Signal detection theory (SDT) has applications in cyber security. Intrusion detection
systems perform signal detection when scanning network traffic and flagging alerts
(Mukkamala, Sung & Abraham, 2005). These systems attempt to differentiate potentially
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malicious network traffic (signal) from the mass flow of normal network traffic (noise).
In the context of CND, a hit would be flagging an actual threat, a false alarm would be
flagging a non-threat as a threat, a miss would be failing to flag an actual threat, and a
correct rejection would be not flagging a non-threat.
Anomalous network traffic is flagged and presented to a cyber network defender.
However, not all abnormal network traffic is malicious. Once the flagged traffic has been
presented to the cyber defender, he/she must make the distinction between the true alerts
and false alarms. This task requires enough information from the task environment and
other sources to help the cyber defender produce a keen awareness of the situation in
order to make the correct decisions of how to respond (Sawyer et. al. 2014).
Intrusion Detection Systems
One aspect of CND involves continuous monitoring of network traffic to discriminate
anomalous patterns from nominal traffic throughout complex computer networks. This is
an impossible task for a human to perform unaided. IDSs have been developed to assist in
making these discriminations. Network defenders use information provided by IDSs to
make decisions about how to respond to potential attacks.
Misuse-based IDSs are the oldest of these systems (Kemmerer & Vigna, 2002). These
systems are programed to search for specific threats to the network. These types of
systems use pre-determined search criteria to evaluate whether or not patterns of traffic in
the network characterizes an attack. Thus, this type of IDS performs information analysis
(Wickens & Dixon, 2007). This tool is characterized by low hit rates because it is only
capable of detecting attacks it is designed to search for. However, this programming also
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means misuse-based systems have low false alarm rates because they do not often flag
non-threats. Misuse-based systems are efficient at detecting known threats they are
programed to detect. However, these types of systems are incapable of detecting
previously-unseen threats. As attacks are always evolving, this makes the effective miss
rate very high (Werlinger, Hawkey, Muldner, Jaferian & Beznosov, 2008). When novel
attack types occur, network defenders must identify and respond to the threat manually.
Afterward, network defenders must update the IDS to search for that attack type in the
future. As hackers are constantly finding novel ways to circumvent these systems,
network defenders are always a step behind the attackers.
Anomaly-based IDSs were developed in response to the limitations of misuse-based
IDSs. These systems sort through network data, flag potentially malicious network
events, and report these events to the human network defender for interpretation
(McHugh, Christie, & Allen, 2000). This automation performs level 1 diagnostic aiding
(information acquisition; Wickens & Dixon, 2007). These serve to make the information
required to complete the task more salient and available to the network defender. As
anomaly-based IDSs are effective at differentiating between normal and abnormal
network traffic, these systems can detect a greater variety of threats to the network at the
cost of high false alarm rates. This trade-off illustrates that in the eyes of a network
defender, even though the miss rate for this type of IDS is very low, the high false alarm
rate obscures the actual threats (Mukkamala, Sung & Abraham, 2005).
Hybrid systems are an approach to balance out the strengths and weaknesses of
misuse-based and anomaly-based systems (Aydin, Zaim & Ceylan, 2008). Some of these
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systems attempt to layer misuse-based and anomaly-based systems in succession (Bronte,
2016; Tesfahun & Bhaskari, 2015). Other attempts involve machine learning or statistical
analysis to narrow in on what attack vector anomalous code represents (Peddabachigari,
Abraham, Grosan & Thomas, 2007). These systems have lower false alarm rates and
higher hit rates than using either of the previous systems individually (Aydin, Zaim &
Ceylan, 2008). As these systems integrate both anomaly-based and misuse-based
systems, hybrid systems can be considered to perform both information acquisition and
information analysis (Wickens & Dixon, 2007).
Research Need
Although research has been conducted on SA in automated systems, the extent to
which the level of diagnostic aiding and reliability of the automation interact to influence
the SA of the operator in CND has yet to be examined. The present research varied levels
of reliability as well as levels of diagnostic aiding to explore how the effectiveness of
diagnostic aiding changes with respect to different levels of reliability.
Although research has been conducted on how reliability and level of automation
influence the SA of human operators (Goodrich et. al, 2007; Madhaven & Philips, 2010;
Rovira, McGarry, & Parasuraman, 2007; Sarter & Schroeder, 2001), currently no studies
have examined this relationship in the domain of cyber security. This study tested these
constructs in this new domain and examined how they can be modified for application in
cyber systems while adding to knowledge of human-automation interaction generally.
Although IDS systems are commonly used, an insufficient amount of empirical
testing has been conducted on how people use and interact with these systems (Werlinger
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et. al. 2008). This research provides empirical evidence for how people interact with
these systems in controlled conditions by varying the reliability of the IDS and the extent
to which the IDS is involved in the decision making.
Literature on IDS development has proposed hybrid IDSs as a viable method for
detecting threats (Aydin, Zaim & Ceylan, 2008). However, this proposition has only been
validated by assessing the hybrid IDS’s increased ability to detect certain attack types
over previous systems (Tesfahun & Bhaskari, 2015). Furthermore, the literature has yet
to examine how human network defenders perform using these types of systems.
The most recent methodology for developing a Hybrid IDS layered the misuse-based
IDS (information analysis) prior to the anomaly-based IDS (information acquisition) in
the processing stream (Kim, Lee & Kim, 2015). Based on previous literature on levels of
automation and a novel definition of hybrid IDSs (information acquisition followed by
information analysis), this study tested whether this method would improve the CSA of
network defenders beyond what other systems can achieve.
Purpose of this Research
The purpose of this study was to explore the moderating effects of level of diagnostic
aiding and automation reliability on the human ability to build CSA in CND. The
strengths and limitations of IDSs led to the conditions in this applied study. Specifically,
the study examined whether hybrid (both information acquisition and information
analysis) automation with a multilayered analysis incorporating both liberal and
conservative response criterion leads to better CSA than both anomaly-based (only
information acquisition) systems with liberal response criterion (high hit rate, and high
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false alarm rates) and misuse-based (information analysis) systems with conservative
response criterion (low hit rates and low false alarm rate)].
Hypotheses
Based on previous literature with respect to diagnostic aiding and its influence on SA,
there was reason to expect that SA would increase with more machine agent assistance in
instances of high reliability (Goodrich et. al, 2007; Madhaven & Philips, 2010). In these
instances, human agents correctly make their decisions regarding task completion based
on the information provided by the automation. Since the reliability of the IDS is
sufficiently high in these situations, the human network defender should be able to rely
more heavily on the accuracy of the information provided by the automation. At the same
time, it was reasonable to expect that human network defenders would refer to the
automation more often in situations of high reliability and would have higher CSA when
performing the task.
Furthermore, because the analysis information provided by the hybrid IDS can be
verified by examining log files, it was reasonable to expect that higher levels of
diagnostic aiding would lead to higher CSA. This relationship would translate into more
successful discrimination between true security alerts and false alarms, which led to the
hypothesis that hybrid IDS systems would lead to higher CSA.
Because the stages of diagnostic aiding (Wickens & Dixon, 2007) map onto
Endsley’s first two levels of SA (Schuster, 2013), diagnostic aiding that performs both
information analysis and information acquisition would allow the human network
defender to develop significantly more CSA than information acquisition without
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analysis (Schuster, 2013). As hybrid IDSs are characterized by performing both
information acquisition and analysis, the following hypotheses were formed:
H1a. Hybrid IDS (information acquisition then analysis) will lead to higher CSA than
anomaly-based (information acquisition),
H1b. Hybrid IDS (information acquisition then analysis) will lead to higher CSA than
misuse-based (information analysis).
When automation is imperfect, information relevant to the task environment that is
presented to the human agent contains errors, which makes it more difficult for the
human to make correct decisions about how to proceed with the task. In these situations,
it was reasonable to expect that the CSA of human defenders would be significantly
decreased because they would have to expend more time and cognitive resources sifting
through errors to make correct decisions. As misuse-based systems tend to present the
results of their analyses without the raw data used in their analysis, it was reasonable to
expect that participants would rely on the automation more heavily in this condition and
make more frequent errors along with the automation. Below are the following
hypotheses.
H2a: Misuse-based IDS (information analysis) will lead to higher levels of CSA of
the human network defender than anomaly-based IDS (information acquisition).
H2b. Misuse-based IDS (information analysis) will lead to lower CSA than Hybrid
IDS (information acquisition and analysis).
False alarms have been shown to be more damaging to SA than misses (Dixon,
Wickens & McCarley, 2006). This effect is particularly impactful for anomaly-based
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IDSs, as they are typically calibrated with a more liberal response criterion that captures
more anomalous network traffic, but produces more false alarms. As anomaly-based
IDSs present raw information to the defender without any form of analysis to sift through
false alarms, anomaly-based systems will produce the lowest levels of CSA because
human defenders will not have the assistance of the automation in any capacity. Below
are the following hypotheses.
H3a. Anomaly-based IDS (information acquisition will lead to lower CSA than
Hybrid IDS (information acquisition and analysis).
H3b. Anomaly-based IDS (information acquisition) will lead to lower CSA than
misuse-based IDSs (information analysis).
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Method
Participants
Participants consisted of 172 individuals, 64 males and 106 females, aged 18 to 50
years. Two participants chose not to disclose their gender. The average age of
participants was 18.79 (SD = 2.76). Participants were recruited from the population of
General Psychology students at San José State University via SONA systems. A power
analysis conducted in G*power for a 3 x 3 factorial ANOVA with a medium effect size f
= .25, α = .05, and power = .8 revealed that 158 participants were required to have
sufficient power for analysis. Participants were compensated with course credit.
Materials
The mock IDS (Figure 1) was a program written in Visual Basic .NET that
displayed simulated network traffic to the participant. It served as a low-fidelity proxy for
an IDS and was used to simulate how network defenders interact with these systems. On
the left side of the screen, simulated network traffic scrolled at a constant rate. This
content was the same across all conditions. On the right side of the window, simulated
alerts from one of three automation conditions were presented. The number of simulated
alerts was the same across conditions. However, the alerts changed depending on the
reliability of the automation because the automation made errors. Sometimes simulated
alerts were flagged distractors instead of threats. In other instances, threats remained in
the simulated network traffic screen and not flagged to the simulated alerts screen.
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Network traffic log events contained distractors in the form of user activity such as:
“User# login.”, “User# logout.”, “User# sent message to user#.”, and “New user
registration.” Log events also contained threats. There were three types of threats with
corresponding log events. A virus corresponded to the log event “Item deleted.” A worm
was associated with the log event “Message sent to user.” A brute force attack could be
recognized by the log event “Unknown user login.”
Participants were tasked with distinguishing threats from distractors and specifying
the attack type. Participants made this decision by selecting one of the three options on a
button array above the log viewer. Participants could click the brute button to indicate a
brute force attack, the worm button for a worm attack, and the virus button for a virus
attack. Participants had to make this decision as soon as they observed the log event. Log
events were 2-3 seconds apart. Once a new log was presented, the click would be in
reference to that newest log event. Once a log has passed, participants were unable to flag
that event as a threat. The intent of this constraint was to create a sense of urgency to the
task and encourage focus.
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Figure 1. An image of the mock IDS
Manipulations
Intrusion detection system. As response criterion is an intrinsic property of each
IDS (Aydin, Zaim & Ceylan, 2008; Mukkamala, Sung & Abraham, 2005; Werlinger,
Hawkey, Muldner, Jaferian & Beznosov, 2008), it varied along with IDS, which resulted
in three conditions: a hybrid IDS with a multilayered use of liberal and conservative
response criterion, a misuse-based IDS with a conservative criterion (low hit rate, low
false alarm rate), and an anomaly-based IDS with a liberal criterion (high hit rate, high
false alarm rate).
Network log events could be displayed in one of three ways, depending on condition.
In the anomaly-based condition, the network log event was displayed by itself (item
deleted). In the misuse-based condition, the corresponding attack type was displayed by
itself (virus). In the hybrid condition, both were displayed (item deleted – virus). The

19

presentation of the attacks was consistent within condition whether the log event was
displayed in the simulated network traffic screen or the simulated alert screen.
Reliability. The reliability of the IDSs was manipulated at three levels (60%, 80%,
95%). We chose 60% to represent a low level of reliability because it has been
determined to be the lower bound of a 95% confidence interval in which automation can
still be effective (Wickens & Dixon, 2007). The reason that 95% was chosen was to
represent a high, yet imperfect, level of reliability, which was expected to prevent
participants from adopting a strategy of completely trusting the automation. 80% was
chosen as a median for the reliability level factor.
The IDS could make three types of errors. It could flag a distractor to the simulated
alert screen, fail to flag a threat to the simulated alert screen, or perform an incorrect
analysis in the form of misattributing an attack to the distractor log instead of the proper
corresponding log. For example, since the correct log event for a virus is “item deleted”
the IDS could flag this as a worm in error. These error types were distributed equally
across reliability conditions.
The reliability represented the proportion of log entries that were incorrectly
interpreted by the automation in the trial. The conditions were created by calculating the
ratio of errors to total number of log events and making sure that ratio corresponded to
the three reliability levels. In this study, the total number of events in all conditions
including both threats and distractors was 542. Of those events, there were 153 attacks
(51 worms, 51 viruses, 51 brutes). This breakdown was consistent across all conditions.
In the 60% reliability condition, 217 of 542 events (40%) were misinterpreted by the
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automation; that is, if the event was anomalous, it would be labeled as normal. If the
event was normal, it would be labeled as anomalous. The process was repeated for each
reliability level across all levels of the IDS variable.
Measures
SAGAT. The situation awareness global assessment technique (SAGAT) is a global
measure designed to access the cognitive elements of SA within a task environment
(Endsley, 1988; Endsley, 2000). During the task, the simulation would freeze at
unexpected moments in which the participant was asked random questions from a battery
about the task environment. Participants’ responses were based on knowledge obtained
from the task environment prior to the freeze. SA was assessed via the type and
correctness of these responses in order to obtain what task relevant knowledge might be
available to the participant at that time and how it is organized in their minds (Endsley,
1995). In this study, questions were only asked at the perception and comprehension
levels of SA because the task had no projection components that were expected to affect
performance. The task did not require participants to project to future outcomes because
they were only required to distinguish threats in real time.
Although participants were not able to predict when the freezes would occur, all
participants were asked questions at the same fixed points in the simulation. This part of
the procedure was to ensure that questions had similar correct answers at those points to
serve as effective comparisons between participants. Participants were not told that those
questions would be asked, or when. However, participants were instructed to pay
attention to the content on which they would be quizzed.
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Task performance. For this study, task performance was defined as the ability of
participants to escalate potential network threats. The performance of the participants was
determined by calculating d’ from the ratio of hits to false alarms. As for the evaluation
criteria for performance success, a hit was a successful escalation of a malicious network
traffic string. A miss was a failure to escalate an actual threat. A false alarm would be the
escalation of a network anomaly that is not malicious. A correct rejection was
successfully not flagging normal network traffic.
Level of confidence. Between the training and actual task, participants were asked to
rate their level of confidence with the task and their potential for success on a scale of 1 –
10 (1 being not very confident and 10 being very confident). Participants were asked,
“On a scale of 1 – 10 (1 being not very confident and 10 being very confident) how
would you rate your level of confidence in your performance on the task?” The purpose
of this measure was to ascertain participants’ expectations of their performance on the
upcoming task.
Level of difficulty. After completing the task, participants were asked to rate the
perceived level of difficulty of the task on a scale of 1 – 10 (1 being very easy 10 being
very difficult). Participants were asked, “On a scale of 1 – 10 (1 being very easy 10 being
very difficult) how would you rate the level of difficulty of the task?” This questions was
intended to determine how difficult the task was for them to complete.
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Demographic questionnaire. A short survey was administered prior to the task to
obtain demographic information about the participants, as well as ascertain their
perceived aptitude with usage of technology. These included age, gender, and self-report
measures on a 1 – 9 scale (1 being not knowledgeable and 9 being very knowledgeable)
about computer competency, familiarity with mobile technology, knowledge of internet
usage, and basic knowledge of cyber security. For computer competency, participants
were asked the following question: “On a scale of 1-9 (with 1 being not knowledgeable
and 9 being very knowledgeable), how would you rate your level of aptitude with
computers?” For aptitude with mobile technology, participants were asked: “On a scale
of 1-9 (with 1 being not knowledgeable and 9 being very knowledgeable), how would
you rate your level of aptitude with mobile technology?” To assess self-reports of internet
usage, participants were asked: “On a scale of 1-9 (with 1 being not knowledgeable and 9
being very knowledgeable), how would you rate your level of aptitude with internet
usage?” Finally, to assess perceived competence with cyber security, participants were
asked the following: “On a scale of 1-9 (with 1 being not knowledgeable and 9 being
very knowledgeable), how would you rate your level of confidence in cyber security?”
Procedure
Participants were recruited through SONA systems and brought into a lab space in the
Department of Psychology at San José State University. The entire duration of the study
was 30 minutes. In the first 10 minutes, participants were provided with an informed
consent form and instructed on the procedure of the experiment. Participants were seated
in front of the computer and asked to complete a brief demographic questionnaire
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administered on Qualtrics. Next, participants were briefed on the details of the task.
Participants were instructed to escalate potential attacks using their best judgement and
information provided by the IDS. Participants were asked to complete a 5-minute training
exercise to get familiar with interacting with the IDS identifying anomalies in the
network traffic, flagging them and escalating. Once complete, the participants were asked
to rate their level of confidence with their understanding of the task from a scale of 1 – 10
(1 not confident and 10 being extremely confident). Next, participants were informed
about the functional properties and reliability of the IDS systems they were to be working
with. Each participant completed one 15-minute session featuring a particular IDS system
(anomaly based, misuse based, or hybrid based). Three times per session, the program
was paused at predetermined points during the session and participants were presented a
question about the current state of the task environment. This question was randomly
selected from a pre-written battery of task-relevant questions about the current state of
the system. Participants were scored on correct responses to the questions. Lastly,
participants were debriefed.
Design
The independent variables (IV) in the study were type of automation (anomaly-based
IDS, misuse-based IDS, and hybrid IDS) and reliability (60%, 80%, 95%). The primary
dependent variables were CSA and task performance. CSA was represented by the
percentage of correct SAGAT scores. Task performance was measured by d’. Data were
analyzed using SPSS version 25. Two 3 x 3 factorial Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)
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tests were conducted, one with SAGAT scores as the dependent variable (DV) and the
second with d’ as the DV. All factors were between-subjects factors.

25

Results
Self-Reported Measures
Across the demographic survey, one response was left blank on the mobile
technology knowledge question and the cyber security knowledge question by one
participant. This omission was due to an error in the survey design that allowed
participants to continue without responding to a question. The descriptive statistics for
the self-reported measures are presented below (Table 1).
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for Self-report Measures of Knowledge of Mobile Technology,
Computers, Internet Usage, and Cyber Security
Variable

M

SD

skewness/SE

kurtosis/SE

n

Mobile

6.61

1.42

-0.72/.18

.013/.37

171

Computer

5.6

1.61

-0.49/.18

-0.06/.37

172

Internet

6.42

1.49

-0.16/.18

-0.43/.37

172

Cyber
Security

4.2

1.8

0.24/.18

-0.52/.37

171

When participants were asked about their knowledge of mobile technology and its
usage, participants tended to rate themselves near 7, forming a negatively skewed
distribution (M = 6.61, SD = 1.42, skewness = -0.72, SE = .18, kurtosis = 0.13, SE = .37,
n = 171). The negative skewness indicates that participants tended to perceive themselves
to be relatively knowledgeable about mobile technology. When asked about their
knowledge of computer usage, participants rated themselves near 6 (M = 5.6, SD = 1.61,
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skewness = -0.49, SE = .18, kurtosis = -0.06, SE = .37, n = 172). The negative skewness
indicates that participants generally view themselves as moderately knowledgeable about
computer usage. Most participants asked about their familiarity with internet usage rated
themselves above a score of 5. The mode of this scale was 6 at 49 responses with a
negative skew (M = 6.42, SD = 1.49, skewness = -0.16, SE = .18, kurtosis = -0.43, SE =
.37, n = 172). The negative skewness indicates that participants generally tended to view
themselves as knowledgeable about internet browsing and usage. However, participants
tended to rate their knowledge of cyber security below a rating of 5. The mode of this
scale was 5 at 37 responses. The average scores here dip compared to the others with a
positive skew (M = 4.2, SD = 1.8, skewness = 0.24, SE = .18, kurtosis = -0.52, SE = .37, n
= 171). The positive skewness indicates that participants tended to view themselves as
less knowledgeable about matters related to cyber security. These combined results
indicate that participants had a relatively firm grasp about knowledge of mobile
technology, computers in general, and internet usage. However, participants tended to
report themselves as much less knowledgeable about cyber security.
For the results related to the self-report measures of confidence and difficulty, it is
important to mention that the following statistics are reported with missing data. The
confidence scores are missing 4% of responses and have an n = 168. Difficulty scores are
missing 8% of responses with an n = 158. The relatively large amount of missing data
justified a test for whether the confidence and difficulty data was missing completely at
random, as the missing data could impact the results. A Little’s MCAR test (Little, 1988)
was conducted for confidence and difficulty. The null hypothesis was not rejected for
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confidence (24, n = 165) = 29.1, p = .22, or for difficulty χ2(24, n = 158) = 29.1, p = .22,
indicating that missing data were missing at random. Participants tended to report their
confidence level with the task above a score of 5. Most participants rated themselves as 5,
6, or 7 with frequencies of 34, 34, and 37, respectively (M = 6.0, SD = 1.56, skewness = 0.34, SE = .19, kurtosis = -0.36, SE = .38, n = 165), indicating that participants viewed
themselves as relatively confident they would perform well on the task after the training,
and understood the nature of the task. After the task was completed, participants tended
to rate the task difficulty above a score of 5. Most participants rated the difficulty a 7 or 8
out of 10 with recorded responses being 45 and 31, respectively. The descriptive statistics
indicate that once the task was completed, participants tended to look back on the task as
relatively difficult (M = 6.5, SD = 1.82, skewness = -0.64, SE = .19, kurtosis = 0.46, SE =
.38, n = 158).
Alternatively, these results suggest a Dunning-Kruger effect (Schlösser, Dunning,
Johnson & Kruger, 2013). This effect is observed when a novice overestimates his or her
ability to perform a task when learning a new skill because novices are incapable of
grasping the nuances that mastery requires. Once novices obtain a higher level of skill,
confidence decreases. As the novice gains enough task knowledge to reach intermediate
level, he or she begins to understand how much more knowledge is required to attain true
mastery. This results in a parabolic confidence curve in which confidence is high at
beginner level, decreases at intermediate level, and returns once mastery is attained. In
the context of this study, participants underwent a 5 min training course during which the
experimenter walked them through the task. Afterwards, participants rated their
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confidence as high. As participants became more familiar with the task and the true
difficulty of the task was revealed, their confidence may have decreased. This
relationship may explain the high reports of perceived task difficulty after the study was
completed.
SAGAT Measure of SA
A 3 (anomaly-based, misuse-based, hybrid) x 3 (60%, 80%, 95%) factorial ANOVA
on IDS type and reliability was conducted for the SAGAT data percent correct.
Descriptive statistics are presented in the table below (Table 2). The bar chart below
depicts the differences in means between conditions for percent correct of SAGAT scores
(Figure 2). The analysis revealed no significant main effects for type of automation, F(2,
163) = .15, p = .86, partial η2 = .002 β = .06, or reliability F(2, 163) = 0.04, p = .96,
partial η2 = .001, β = .07. These main effects were not qualified by a significant
interaction, F(4, 163) = 0.87, p = .48, partial η2 = .02, β = .27. These results indicate that
this study cannot conclude that any observable difference in impact to participant CSA
exists between the different intrusion detections systems tested, their affiliated criterions,
or the reliability settings.
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Means for Percent Correct of SAGAT

0.1
0.09
0.08
0.07
0.06
0.05
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.01
0

Condition
60

80

95

MisuseIDS

AnomalyIDS

HybridIDS

Figure 2. Means for percent correct of SAGAT

Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for Percent Correct of SAGAT Scores
Variable

M

SD

skewness/SE

kurtosis/SE

n

Type of
Automation

1.0

0.13

2.15/.19

3.59/.37

172

Reliability

78.43

14.39

-0.18/.19

-1.51/.37

172

Age

18.79

2.76

9.21/.19

98.73/.37

172

Percent
Correct

0.05

0.13

2.15/.19

3.59/.37

172

Performance (d’)
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A 3 (anomaly-based, misuse-based, hybrid) x 3 (60%, 80%, 95%) factorial ANOVA
between IDS type and reliability was conducted for d’. Descriptive statistics are
presented in the table below (Table 3). The bar chart below depicts the differences in
means between conditions for task performance (Figure 3). The analysis revealed no
significant main effects for type of automation, F(2, 163) = 1.03 , p = .36, partial η2 =
.01, β = .23, or reliability, F(2, 163) = 0.12, p = .89, partial η2 = .001, β = .07. These main
effects were not qualified by a significant interaction, F(4, 163) = 1.46, p = .22, partial η2
= .035, β = .45. These results indicate that this study cannot conclude that any observable
difference in impact to participant CSA exists between the different intrusion detections
systems tested, their affiliated criterions, or the reliability settings.
1
0.9
0.8

Means for d'

0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0

60

80

95

Misuse

Condition
Figure 3. Means for task performance

Anomaly

Hybrid
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics for Task Performance
Variable

M

SD

skewness/SE

kurtosis/SE

n

Type of
Automation

1.0

0.82

0.0/.18

-1.5/.37

172

Reliability

78.34

1.09

-0.18/.18

-1.5/.37

172

.72

1.13

-0.37/.19

-0.83/.37

172

d’

Below are the means for the performance calculations (Table 4) and a projection of
expected performance of participants across conditions (Table 5). As the hybrid IDS
layers misuse-based analysis on top of anomaly-based information gathering, multiplying
the miss rates of each will give us a probability of how hybrid systems are expected to
perform. The miss rates for misuse and anomaly-based systems were multiplied to obtain
a projection for what the hybrid criterion values should be in an ideal state. These could
be compared to the observed values from participants. As displayed, the actual observed
miss rates for the hybrid condition are higher than the projected value. The small negative
values suggest participants underperformed from the expected. This finding is not
surprising as the ANOVA results were not significant.
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Table 4
Means for Sensitivity, Bias, Criterion, Hit Rates, and False Alarm Rates Across
Conditions.
Variable

d’

Beta

C

Hit

FA

60%

.77

2.91

-0.86

.39

.15

80%

.67

2.72

-0.85

.37

.18

95%

.73

2.59

-0.96

.36

.16

Misuse

.47

2.54

-1.11

.27

.15

Anomaly

.49

3.15

-.72

.45

.16

Hybrid

.69

2.52

-.87

.38

.17

Table 5
Projected Criterion for Hybrid Condition Compared with Actual Observed Values.
Variable

M
Misuse
misses

M
Anomaly
misses

Projected M
Hybrid misses

Observed M Hybrid
misses

Difference

60%

0.65

0.56

0.36

0.63

-.027

80%

0.77

0.56

0.43

0.55

-0.12

95%

0.71

0.54

0.38

0.67

-0.29

Average criterion for the participants was calculated between the reliability
conditions to see if their own individual criterion would be affected by reliability. The
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equation used was the normal distribution function -.5*(NORMSINV(hits) +
NORMSINV(false alarms)). This calculation was performed on the 60%, 80%, 95%
reliability conditions. The outputs for these calculations were as follows: for 60% the
output was 0.67; for 80% the output was 0.63; for 95% it was 0.67. These results suggests
that the average participant criterion was a bit lower for the 80% condition.
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Discussion
The purpose of this study was to explore the moderating effects of level of diagnostic
aiding and automation reliability on the human ability to build CSA in CND.
Specifically, this study examined whether hybrid (information acquisition and
information analysis) automation with multilayered analysis incorporating both liberal
and conservative response criterion lead to better CSA than anomaly-based (information
acquisition) systems with liberal response criterion (high hit rate, high false alarm rates)
or misuse-based (information analysis) systems with conservative response criterion (low
hit rate, low false alarm rates). As the results are inconclusive, this study was unable to
achieve this goal. Although this research did not reveal relationships between the
variables tested, it can inform how limitations of the study may have affected the results.
Finally, an experimental redesign that may mitigate these limitations is proposed.
Limitations of this Study
One of the limitations of this study was having insufficient power to achieve
statistical significance. Given the obtained effect sizes, it is possible that the effect size
was overestimated during the power analysis and the actual effect is much smaller,
meaning that the sample size used in this study was too small to observe the actual effect.
It is also possible that the participant pool itself may have been mismatched to the
practitioner-focused area of cyber security examined in this study. Intrusion detection and
threat escalation are professional cyber security activities. The participants in this study
were not cyber security practitioners. This incongruence was deliberate, yet expected to
yield interpretable results. SJSU General Psychology students were chosen as the primary
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participant pool for this study instead of cyber security practitioners because unlike
practitioners, the participants were readily available. Cyber security practitioners are
more inaccessible due to the nature of their profession. Some of these reasons include:
the secrecy and security limitations of their work, the time it would take to participate,
and the lack of resources for appropriate compensation. Using SJSU students afforded the
ability to bypass some of these limitations.
The partial eta squares reported indicate relatively small effect sizes. Combined with
the relatively high self-reported task difficulty scores and low self-reported ratings of
cyber security domain knowledge, the findings suggest that a floor effect may have
obscured the ability to observe differences between conditions. Steps were taken to make
the task more appropriate for this population. Extensive piloting resulted in the
development of contingencies in the form of more explicit instructions, longer and more
rigorous training exercises, reduced workload, and simplified SAGAT questions. The
ultimate task that was developed shares little overlap with the professional task. Thus,
simplified task simulations may not be effective. Despite efforts to combat task difficulty,
the results suggest that the task was too difficult for participants to understand and
complete with their available domain knowledge. Future iterations of the study should
include stronger manipulations in the form of more robust SAGAT questions. Longer and
more rigorous training may be required unless the task is simplified or modified to be
more familiar to participants from this population.
Another possible explanation for the small effect size could be that the constructs
examined in this study do not operate in the same manner in the domain of cyber security
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as they do in other domains in human factors. It is possible that the decisions in CND and
the CSA required to make them differ from other human-machine systems examined in
previous literature. The likely floor effects would obscure observation of this possibility.
Future research that reduce floor effects could provide more insight into this possible
problem by allowing better observation into human decision making in CND.
As most participants rated themselves relatively low on cyber security domain
knowledge, it is possible that participants were not lacking in understanding of cyber
security. Perhaps, how end users conceptualize cyber security was misaligned with the
task they were asked to perform. That being said, it is possible to examine the influences
of level of automation and automation reliability on human CSA in this domain with this
participant pool. These constructs could be transformed and applied in a way that is not
based on intrusion detection. Rather, a task that is more grounded in the day to day lives
of end users, which might include being safe in the mobile, computer, and online worlds.
Participants reported being relatively confident in their knowledge on these subjects. That
knowledge could be applied to a typical behavior that end users engage in everyday, such
as checking emails and evaluating the strategies involved in avoiding exploitation in the
form of phishing attempts.
Proposed Modified Study Design
To adjust the study and compensate for the misalignment, the study could be revised
by changing the nature of the task to something more relevant to the daily tasks of the
population. For example, participants could perform a phishing email detection task with
a Gmail simulation in conjunction with an automated feature that helps flag phishing
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attempts and bring them to the attention of the user. In this instance, the level of
automation could be varied by the extent to which the automation is involved in decision
making around determining whether or not a suspicious email is a phishing attempt. In
one condition it could send a small notification indicating that the email seems different
than one the user typically receives. For example, an email from a sender that is not
recognized in your contacts. In another, it could send it to a spam folder without notifying
the user. In the last condition, it could send to the spam folder and notify the user.
Reliability could be manipulated similarly to the current study, in that it varies the errors
the automation makes by flagging non-phishing emails at different rates (60%, 80%,
95%). CSA would be evaluated from a performance-based measure similar to the current
study with signal detection d’ calculated from a ratio of hits (ability to detect a phishing
email) to false alarms (flagging a non-phishing email). Responses would be recorded by
clicking a button to flag as phishing and notify the service provider. Responses would be
attached directly to the email that inspired the click by aligning the timestamps, which
will ensure that the response can be coded with a specific signal to improve accuracy of
the analysis.
A simulated Gmail account could be created through a user interface prototyping tool.
These tools create a series of interconnected static screens that can simulate interactivity
similar to a flipbook. When these prototypes are fully constructed and completely
interconnected, a simulation of fully interactive task environments can be created.
Participants will be able to click on any email or folder in this environment as though it
were a real account. Participants could be given a hypothetical scenario for the study.

38

Participants could be told that over summer vacation their SJSU email account has
received hundreds of messages they had neglected to check. The first email in the inbox
could be from the SJSU email administrator informing participants that a new automated
phishing email detection system has been implemented on SJSU email accounts. To test
this new system, fake phishing email attempts increased in prevalence over the summer.
All students should go through their inbox to identify these attempts along with this
system.
A SAGAT could also be performed examining the perception and comprehension
elements of CSA about the phishing attempts. While participants click through the
simulated inbox, the simulation could freeze after a certain number of clicks. This
number of clicks could be randomized through the programing of the simulation. The
click could bring participants to one of the interconnected nodes. These would be a blank
screen with a SAGAT question and a continue button. Participants could log their
response and click continue to bring them back to the inbox screen.
SAGAT questions might include perception level elements of end user CSA. For
example, these questions could ask: how many phishing emails have been detected so
far? What is the current status of your inbox? Questions could also include
comprehension elements, which would require participants to integrate multiple
perception level elements together or explain in more detail how they are distinguishing
phishing emails from non-phishing emails. Questions of this nature might include: how
many phishing emails have been detected since the last non-phishing email you found?
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At what time was the most recent phishing email detected? What clue tipped you off to
the last phishing email?
This new experimental design should address some of the issues with task difficulty
and construct validity in this current study. Changing the nature of the task from intrusion
detection to identifying email phishing techniques will ground the detection of cyber
threats in something familiar to the end user. SJSU students should be able to conduct
this task more effectively and accurately, which will likely dissipate floor effects and
allow for more visibility into how the level of automation and automation reliability
interact to moderate CSA in end user cyber hygiene practices.
Conclusion
As reported, the analyses were not significant. This study could not observe any main
effects or interactions effects across type of automation or the reliability conditions for
both percent correct of SAGAT scores and performance scores. This study could not
ascertain the extent to which intrusion detections systems and reliability moderate CSA in
CND. The scores for confidence and difficulty suggest a Dunning-Kruger effect in which
participants felt confident going into the task, but found it very difficult by the time it was
completed. This finding suggests that the training program may have been insufficient to
prepare participants for a task that was too difficult for them to perform.
The relatively high self-reported knowledge ratings for mobile, computer and internet
usage when compared with lower ratings for cyber security related knowledge suggest
that participants may have had insufficient domain knowledge to perform the task
successfully. However, it is also possible that participants’ knowledge was mismatched
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with the practitioner focused cyber security task in this study. Modifying the task to be
more aligned with the knowledge base of the participant pool may lead to more
successful observations in future iterations of this study.
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Appendix B
REQUEST FOR YOUR PARTICPATION IN RESEARCH
TITLE OF THE STUDY
The Effect of Level of Automation and Reliability of IDS Systems on Cyber Situation
Awareness
NAME OF THE RESEARCHER
Principle Investigator: Ian Cooke San Jose State University graduate student
Faculty Advisor: Dr. David Schuster PhD.
PURPOSE
The purpose of this research is to identify how and/or to what extent the level of
automation and the reliability of intrusion detection systems influences the ability for human
computer network defenders to successfully recognize cyberattacks.
PROCEDURES
Upon signing this agreement, you will be asked to conduct a quick survey about your basic
characteristics (gender, age, etc.) and your knowledge of computers and cyber security. After that,
you’ll sit in front of a laptop computer and step into the role of a network defender and search
through network traffic and identify cyberattacks with the help of our intrusion detection system
simulator. You’ll start by performing a 10 minute training exercise to help you get familiar with
the task. When you’re ready, you’ll then perform the main task in one 10 minute section. Finally,
you’ll be debriefed and given credit upon completion of the experiment.
POTENTIAL RISKS
There are no potential risks beyond those incurred during normal interaction with a
computer.
POTENTIAL BENEFITS
There are no direct benefits to you by participating in this research beyond course credit.
However, your participation will contribute to our knowledge of cyber security and may lead to
safer networks in the future.
COMPENSATION

Should you choose to participate, you will be compensated with one hour of Sona
credit toward your Introduction to Psychology course requirement. You also have the
option of completing an alternative assignment for credit in supplement of or in
conjunction with this study. The details of this assignment are located on the San Jose
State research pool website at the following link:
http://www.sjsu.edu/psych/Undergraduates/subjectpool.html
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In addition to earning credit for your course, research participation gives you handson experience with the psychological research process and introduces you to techniques
that may be useful for a career in psychology. It also allows you to contribute to the
scientific study of mind, brain, and behavior.
CONFIDENTIALITY

You will be represented by a number throughout the study. The only record we will
have of participation will be the signed informed consent document. The informed
consent document will not be linked to your data once it has been collected.
Informed consent documents will be kept in the lab behind a locked door and/or in
David Schuster’s locked office. Data without identifying marks will be shared within the
research team.
PARTICIPANT RIGHTS
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. You can refuse to participate in the
entire study or any part of the study without any negative effect on your relations with San Jose
State University. You also have the right to skip any question you do not wish to answer. This
consent form is not a contract. It is a written explanation of what will happen during the study if
you decide to participate. You will not waive any rights if you choose not to participate, and there
is no penalty for stopping your participation in the study.
QUESTIONS OR PROBLEMS
You are encouraged to ask questions at any time during this study.
• For further information about the study, please contact Ian Cooke [email:
iacooke@sjsu.edu]
• Complaints about the research may be presented to Lynda Heiden [email:
Lynda.heiden@sjsu.edu]
• For questions about participants’ rights or if you feel you have been harmed in any way
by your participation in this study, please contact Dr. Pamela Stacks, Associate Vice President of
the Office of Research, San Jose State University, at 408-924-2479.
SIGNATURES
Your signature indicates that you voluntarily agree to be a part of the study, that the details
of the study have been explained to you, that you have been given time to read this document, and
that your questions have been answered. You will receive a copy of this consent form for your
records.

Participant Signature
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_____________________________
____________________________________________________ Participant’s Name (printed)
Participant’s Signature Date

Researcher Statement
I certify that the participant has been given adequate time to learn about the study and ask
questions. It is my opinion that the participant understands his/her rights and the purpose, risks,
benefits, and procedures of the research and has voluntarily agreed to participate.

___________________________________________________________________
__________________ Signature of Person Obtaining Informed Consent Date.
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Appendix C

Protocol for Ian’s Thesis Study
Setting up a SONA researcher account
Email someone about this and she’ll get you signed up.
She should give you a username and password to login. You can change this when
you get in.
Your student email should be your login and you’ll have to make a password.
Once you’re in your account, I’ll put you as admins on my study so you should be
able to see it.
Putting up study sessions to SONA
Once you have your account and you’re on my study, you should be able to see it
under the “my studies” page.
You can click on my study name and it will give you details about the study.
To add timeslots: (you’ll have some liberty here)
1. Click the timeslot button on next to my study name on the “my studies” page.
You’ll be able to see a list of all the available previous, scheduled timeslots and who is
running them when.
2. You can add one or multiple slots (tabs up at the top.)
3. Specify number of slots
4. write the date of the study
5. Specify the time
6. free time between slots is for multiple (just if you want a break in between)

53

7. Participants per slot will always be 3 (number of computers we have to run)
8. Specify the location of your lab space you selected so your participant knows
where to go
9. click add and you’re done!

On the day…Set up the stuff (BEFORE THE PARTICIPANT ARRIVES)
Make sure you bring all three laptops and the master flash drive with you. It will
always be in a backpack on the back shelf. DOUBLE CHECK TO MAKE SURE IT”S
ALL THERE. There are three laptops, chargers, and one master flash drive.
1. Turn on all laptops. Make sure they are all plugged in to the wall.

2. Get online and set up the Qualtrics preliminary survey. This is in the VECTR Lab
qualtics account. (let me know if you don’t have access) The survey will be called: Ian’s
Thesis Demographic Survey

3. Open the folder on the desktop called Ian’s Experiment.
Run the log viewer program for the training condition (check the participant sheet
excel document to see the participant number and version ID. Make sure these all match
up and load the proper version)
Make sure that the participant number you put in corresponds to what version
you’re supposed to open on the sheet.
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one.

4. Have consent forms set up for each participant.
Write the participant number and the condition ID on the top right corner of each
Cross reference the spreadsheet to make sure everything is right.
5. Open the Participant list and test condition study spreadsheet and write down the

participant’s name, gender, age etc. next to the participant number and test condition
they’re in. DOUBLE CHECK AGAIN TO MAKE SURE EVERYTHING IS RIGHT
AND LINES UP.

Running the study
1. Bring participant into the shared data collection space (room specification will be
up to you)

2. Have the participant read and sign the written consent form and make sure they
understand everything. Be sure to ask them if they have any questions.

3. Explain the basics of the experiment tell them you’ll be happy to discuss any of
the details of the study and/or answer any questions in the debriefing session at the end of
the experiment. Say this:
“Thanks for participating in the study today. You will be put in the role of a cyber
defender. You’ll be tasked with monitoring a network and identifying potential attacks
for about 15 minutes. I’ll explain in more detail momentarily and if you have any
questions about the nature of the study, I’ll be happy to answer them at the end. But first,
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please take our preliminary survey so we can learn a bit about you and your familiarity
with computers and technology.”
4. Have the participant take the preliminary survey and log their responses (it
should do this automatically when they’re done, but double check)

5. Explain the instructions of the participant.
“OK, thanks for doing the survey, now we’re going to get you trained on the task.
You’ll be watching a log simulation of network traffic. Your task is to correctly identify
the potential hacks to the network. Highlight the most recent log presented. If it’s an
attack, hit notify. If it isn’t, hit pass. It’s important to keep track of the attacks and
distractors to distinguish them, so try to pay close attention to the timestamps of the
attacks and distractors, and how many have occurred.
There are 3 types of attacks: Viruses, Worms, and Brutes. Viruses are indicated by a
log called Item deleted, Worms are indicated by message sent to user #, and brutes are
indicated by unknown user login. We’ll do a little practice session to get you used to
everything. Any questions?”
Once you’re done explaining load the training session and tell them to click begin
whenever they’re ready. Inform them to ask questions and to tell you when they’re done
with the training.
Stay with them while they’re completing their training and guide them through the
process. Do your best to answer any questions they have about the task or the program.
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When they’re done, ask if they have any questions. Also, ask them how they feel
about everything and gauge their confidence. There’s nothing we can do, but it would just
be good to know.

6. Load the actual trial. Double check the sheet to make sure it’s the right condition.
In the analysis only condition, cover the data log on the lefthand side with some
paper.
Input the proper participant number in the box and hit enter.
Tell the participant to click OK begin whenever he/she is ready.

7. At three times during the session, the program will freeze and leave to another
screen. When this happens, randomly choose one of the SAGAT question printed out and
hand it to the participant.
Give them a minute to write a response or give up.
Make sure you write the participant number on the top right of the page and set it
aside.

8. Be sure to pay attention to any peculiar things about the study (e.g. did the
participant have a problem with something? Did the logviewer glitch? Was someone
extra confused? Any idiosyncratic things)
When you observe anything like this, be sure to mention it in the comments.
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Open the Participant list and test condition excel sheet where you logged the
participant’s name age gender etc. and write anything strange in that comment section.

Finishing the study
1. When the participant has finished, ask them “on a scale of 1 – 10 1 being
extremely easy and 10 being extremely difficult how would you rate the difficulty of this
task. Have them write their response on the spreadsheet.

2. When participants finish the survey, ask them if they have any questions. If they
don’t, tell them you will give them credit as soon as they leave and tell them they are free
to go. Thank them for their time.

3. For those that are curious, say the following:
“We looking to improve the situation awareness of computer network defenders.
We’re varying the reliability of the automation and the extent to which the automation is
involved in the task to see if we can optimize which combination will increase SA the
most and produce the most successful outcome.”

4. Ask them if they have any further questions. Do your best to answer them, but
“I’m not sure” is an acceptable response if you don’t know.

Finishing the studies for the day
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When you’re all done with running your sessions there’s going to be some clean up
work to do…
1. The data is all stored locally on each computer. You’re going to have to take the
master flash drive and download all of the recent sessions off of the “experiment logs”
data folder.
2. Clean up any mess you or your participants made while you were there and make
sure the door is locked when you leave. We need to leave these shared data spaces in
better conditions than we found them. Remember that you’re representing VECTR lab.
3. Grab everything you brought with you and bring it back to the lab
4. Plug the flashdrive into one of the computers and upload all of the data to my
master data folder in my Ian’s thesis 2018 folder on the VECTR team drive.
5. Put all equipment (computers, chargers, and master flashdrive) back to the
backpack where you found it on the shelf.
6. make sure you return whatever key to whatever room back to the psych office
and the lab key when you’re done.
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Appendix D

Ian's Thesis Demographic Survey
Start of Block: Default Question Block

Q10
Hi there!

Thanks for your participation in thus study! The following preliminary survey is intended
to gather basic demographic information about you and your level of comfort with
computers, technology and security. When you're ready, please click below to begin.
Have fun!

Page
Break
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End of Block: Default Question Block
Start of Block: Default Question Block

Q4 Age
________________________________________________________________

Q5 Sex

o
o
o

Male (1)
Female (2)
Choose not answer (3)

Q6 On a scale of 1-9 (with 1 being not knowledgeable and 9 being very
knowledgeable), how would you rate your level of aptitude with computers?
Computer Aptitude (1)
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Q7 On a scale of 1-9 (with 1 being not knowledgeable and 9 being very
knowledgeable), how would you rate your level of aptitude with mobile technology?
Mobile Technology Aptitude (1)

Q8 On a scale of 1-9 (with 1 being not knowledgeable and 9 being very
knowledgeable), how would you rate your level of aptitude with internet usage?
Internet Usage Aptitude (1)

Q9 On a scale of 1-9 (with 1 being not knowledgeable and 9 being very
knowledgeable), how would you rate your level of confidence in cyber security?
Cyber Security Confidence (1)

End of Block: Default Question Block

62

Appendix E

SAGAT Questions
• How many worms have been detected at this point?
• How many brutes have been detected at this point?
• How many viruses have been detected at this point?
• At what time was the most recent Virus detected?
• At what time was the most recent Brute detected?
• How many new users have registered since the last virus was detected?
• How many users have logged in since the last brute was detected?
• How many user messages have been sent to other users since the last worm was
detected?
• At what time was the most recent worm detected?
• How many users have logged out since the last brute was detected?

